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SOCIAL WELFARE-EFFECT OF ELIGIBILITY
FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ON
A.F.D.C. BENEFITS
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children [hereinafter
AFDC] program is the largest and most controversial of the four
"categorical" assistance programs established by the Social Secu-
rity Act of 19351 [hereinafter cited as the Act]. It is based upon a
plan of federal-state cooperation, with each state administering its
own AFDC program in accordance with a federally approved plan.'
The federal government, in turn, carries a large share of each pro-
gram's cost through a complex system of matching grants.3
In order to qualify for AFDC benefits a family must first estab-
lish the presence of a "dependent child" in their home.4 Prior to
1961, a child could be dependent only if he had been deprived of
parental support by reason of the death, continued absence from
home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent.5 However, in
1961, Congress added a fourth category of dependency by expand-
ing § 606(a) so that a child in need "by reason of the unemploy-
ment. . . of his father" was also deemed to be dependent.' Under
a 1968 amendment to the Act, this expanded definition could not
be incorporated into a state plan under the AFDC program unless
the state agreed to deny aid to a dependent child so defined "with
The four assistance categories are: Old Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 301-06
(1970); Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C §§ 601-10 (1970); Aid
to the Blind, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06 (1970); and Aid to the Permanently and Totally
Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-55 (1970).
2 42 U.S.C. § 601-04 (1970).
Burr v. Smith, 322 F. Supp. 980 (W.D. Wash. 1971), afl'd mem., 404 U.S.
1027 (1972).
4 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1) who has been de-
prived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued
absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and
who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother,
sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first
cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or
more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under
the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one and (as deter-
mined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secre-
tary) a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or
regularly attending a course of vocational or technical training designed
to fit him for gainful employment ....
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970). The original version required unemployment of a
268
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respect to any week for which such child's father receives unem-
ployment compensation." '7
In order to qualify for funding under this unemployed father
program, Vermont promulgated a regulation under its participat-
ing "Aid to Needy Families with Children" (ANFC) program8 dis-
allowing benefits during any week in which the father received
unemployment compensation.' Mr. Glodgett and other Vermont
parents of minor children became unemployed and applied for
welfare benefits under the state's ANFC program. Their ANFC
benefits were either terminated or denied because of the receipt of
unemployment compensation by the father in each of the families,
"parent," Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75. The word "father"
was substituted for "parent" in 1968, Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. 90-248, tit. II, §
203(a), 81 Stat. 882 (1968), though no change in meaning was intended. See 1967
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 2997. An unemployed father is defined as one
who is employed "less than 100 hours a month." 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1)(i) (1974).
42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1970). This is known as the "AFDC-U option."
It allows, but does not require the states to make assistance available to children
made dependent by virtue of their father's unemployment. Once a state adopts an
AFDC-U program it remains free to terminate it. United Low Income, Inc. v.
Fisher, 340 F. Supp. 150 (S.D. Me. 1972), aff'd 470 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir.); Cheley v.
Burson, 324 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Ga. 1971), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Cheley v.
Parnham for failure to docket within proper time, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Henry v.
Betit, 323 F. Supp. 418 (D. Alaska 1971). The effect of this amendment was to
change the 1961 amendment which provided that a state could choose to deny all
or any part of an AFDC stipend to a family during any month in which the father
received unemployment compensation. Instead, the 1968 amendment mandated
denial of benefits to a family during any week in which the father received unem-
ployment compensation, thus foreclosing the states' privilege of having the option
of providing full, partial, or no benefits where the father received unemployment
compensation. See Glodgett v. Betit, 368 F. Supp. 211 (D. Vt. 1973).
"The name of the federal program was changed in 1962 to 'Aid and Services
to Needy Families with Children,' and the name of the assistance thereunder be-
came 'Aid to Families with Dependent Children' (AFDC). Pub. L. 87-543, 76 Stat.
185. Vermont has chosen to call its participating program 'Aid to Needy Families
with Children' (ANFC)". Philbrook v. Glodgett, 95 S. Ct. 1893, n.1 (1975).
9 Vermont Welfare Regulation 2333.1, which provides in part:
An 'unemployed father' is one whose minor children are in need because
he is out of work, is working part time, or is not at work due to an
industrial dispute (strike) for at least 30 days prior to receiving assis-
tance, provided that:
3. He is not receiving Unemployment Compensation during the
same week as assistance is granted."
Glodgett v. Betit, 368 F. Supp. 211, 212 n.2 (D. Vt. 1973).
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even though the amounts receivable under unemployment com-
pensation were substantially less than those available under
ANFC.1' The affected families filed a class action in the United
States District Court for the District of Vermont to enjoin the
Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Social Services and
the Secretary of HEW from enforcing the state regulation and the
federal statute." A three-judge district court concluded from the
language of the federal statute that the disqualifying factor was
actual payment of, rather than mere eligibility for unemployment
compensation. Under this construction of the statute, a father who
otherwise qualified had an option to receive either unemployment
compensation or state welfare assistance, whichever was greater,
and the Vermont regulation was to be construed accordingly.'" On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed,
holding that the district court correctly concluded "that a family
eligible for ANFC benefits under [42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(2)(C)(ii)]
can be excluded only for each week in which unemployment com-
pensation is actually received by the father." Philbrook v.
Glodgett, 95 S. Ct. 1893 (1975).
The Philbrook decision is commendable in that it will result
in an overall increase in the level of the benefits paid to families
who previously relied solely upon unemployment compensation,
but were otherwise eligible for AFDC-U payments. In many states
the average monthly AFDC-U payment is greater than the pay-
ment obtainable under unemployment compensation for the same
period. For example, in West Virginia, as of April, 1974, the aver-
age AFDC-U payment was $210.83 per month, while the average
unemployment compensation was $193.50 per month.'" From a
literal interpretation of the statute in question, i.e., 42 U.S.C. §
607(b) (2)(C) (ii), made in isolation from other provisions of the Act,
a court could justifiably conclude that the disqualifying factor is
actual receipt of unemployment compensation benefits rather than
mere eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits. How-
ever compelling such a conclusion may be, the fact remains that
permitting AFDC payments to entirely supplant unemployment
" "The amount receivable under ANFC was $176.00 per month greater than
that receivable under unemployment compensation in the case of Mr. Glodgett,
$238.00 greater in the case of Mr. Percy and $338.00 greater in the case of Mr.
Derosia." Glodgett v. Betit, 368 F. Supp. 211, 213 (D. Vt. 1973).
" Glodgett v. Betit, 368 F. Supp. 211 (D. Vt. 1973).
12 Id. at 218.
' Public Assistance Statistics, April 1974 (HEW).
[Vol. 78
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compensation benefits whenever the amounts receivable under
AFDC are greater than those receivable under unemployment
compensation is contrary to the intent of Congress as evidenced by
the Social Security Act, the legislative history of the Act, and
consistent administrative construction of the Act. Furthermore,
the Philbrook decision reverses the only other Supreme Court case
on point'4 and is at cross purposes with basic concepts of prudent
resource management and economic efficiency.
The root of the problem is the anomalous statutory treatment
of unemployment income. Under the Act, receipt of income other
than unemployment compensation does not render a family per se
ineligible for AFDC.'5 If the amounts received are insufficient to
bring the family's income up to the state-determined "standard of
need," then welfare payments are reduced proportionately so that
the total of outside income plus AFDC payment will be equal to
the standard of need.' 7 However, as has been seen, the 1968 amend-
ment expressly provides for termination of AFDC benefits upon
the receipt of unemployment payments.'" That Congress has, in
" Burr v. Smith, 322 F. Supp. 980 (W.D. Wash. 1971), aff'd 404 U.S. 1027
(1972), in which AFDC applicants challenged a nearly identical Washington statute
and welfare regulation implementing § 607(b)(2)(C)(ii). The regulation provided
that: "an otherwise eligible child shall be ineligible for [AFDC-U] with respect to
any week for which his father receives unemployment compensation." 322 F. Supp.
at 983. The district court in Burr held that "a father cannot avoid disqualification
simply by failing to register for and receive unemployment compensation." 322 F.
Supp. at 984.
," Glodgett v. Betit, 368 F. Supp. 211, 217 n.9 (D, Vt. 1973).
Id See also, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). The states are responsible for
setting the standard of need, subject to certain requirements imposed by HEW
forbidding discrimination by the states in setting their standards and providing for
some regularity in the standard-determining process. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1968), n. 14. The standard of need is simply the state-determined amount
which an eligible family with no resources or income would need for support.
'1 Once the state has established a standard of need, it must subtract from this
amount the family's available resources (including income) to arrive at a "budget-
ary deficit." This budgetary deficit is referred to in the Act as the recipients'
"need." Thus the Act provides that "the State agency shall, in determining need,
take into consideration any other income or resources of any child or relative claim-
ing aid to families with dependent children .... " 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(10)(A), §
602(a)(7), 1201(a)(8), 1352(a)(8) (1970). In some instances the AFDC grant is not
reduced pro tanto, but only by a percentage of the amount of income. These are
the "income disregard" provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1970). The major disre-
gard provision of the statute excludes the first thirty dollars from a person's total
monthly earned income and also eliminates one-third of the remainder of such
income. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (1970).
" 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1970).
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fact, provided such special treatment for unemployment compen-
sation income and not for other forms of income strongly suggests
that there must have been some purpose behind this treatment.,'
In order to discern this purpose it is necessary to examine 42
U.S.C. § 607(b)(2)(C)(ii) in context with other pertinent sections
of the Act and with due regard for its legislative history.
The history behind the enactment of § 607(b)(2)(C)(ii) quite
clearly indicates that it was Congress' intent to exclude from
AFDC-U eligibility those fathers who were "qualified to receive"
unemployment compensation as well as those who actually
received unemployment compensation. In the House Conference
Committee's report of the January, 1968 amendments to the Social
Security Act, both the Senate version (which'was not enacted) and
the House version (which was enacted) were explained as follows:
"Unemployed Fathers under AFDC" Amendments Nos. 186,
189, 190, 191, 193 and 195; Section 407 of the Social Security
Act, as amended by Section 203(a) of the House bill, defined
an unemployed father (for purposes of determining the eligibil-
ity of his children for AFDC) so as to exclude fathers who do
not have six or more quarters of work in any thirteen calendar
quarter periods ending within one year prior to the application
for aid, and fathers who receive (or are qualified to receive) any
unemployment compensation under state law. (emphasis
added). The Senate Amendments removed these exclusions and
restored the provisions of the present law under which a state
may at its option wholly or partly deny AFDC for any month
where the father receives unemployment compensation during
the month.2 0
The fact that the words "or are qualified to receive" were enclosed
within parentheses suggests that the House Conference Committee
realized that the word "receives" included both the actual receipt
and the qualification for such receipt."t In addition, at the time the
" That there may be a different treatment between different classes of income
is recognized in 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(1) (1974), which states that a state plan for
AFDC must provide that "all types of income will be taken into consideration in
the same way, except where specifically authorized by Federal statute." (emphasis
added).
20 Brief for Appellant Philbrook at 19, Philbrook v. Glodgett, 95 S. Ct. 1893
(1975).
22 Insight into the legislative intent concerning the original, temporary 1961
amendment which gave birth to the AFDC-U program is provided by President
Kennedy's message proposing AFDC-U legislation in which he stated: "Under the
[Vol. 78
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1968 amendment was passed, Congress was primarily concerned
with reducing the number of welfare recipients and not with per-
mitting recipients to refuse to accept an available resource. 2 Fi-
nally, HEW regulations clearly provided that all potential re-
sources of income were to be exhausted before an applicant could
avail himself of AFDC benefits. These regulations require that the
state plan must "[p]rovide that the agency will establish and
carry out policies with reference to applicants' and recipients' po-
tential sources of income that can be developed to a state of
availability. ' ' 1
Not only is the Supreme Court's decision baffling in view of
the congressional intent surrounding the enactment of §
607 (b) (2) (C) (ii), but, by encouraging unemployed fathers to enlist
their families on the welfare roles rather than receive unemploy-
ment compensation, it effects a result which is contrary to the
purpose of the unemployment compensation program. Unemploy-
ment compensation and AFDC are two distinct and mutually ex-
clusive programs. The purpose of unemployment compensation is
to provide unemployment insurance for temporarily unemployed
workers so that they will not have to turn to welfare in order to
support their families." Unemployment compensation was to be a
"first line of defense" to carry workers over temporary periods of
unemployment "without resort to any other form of assistance."1
aid to dependent children program, needy children are eligible for assistance if their
fathers are deceased, disabled, or family deserters. In logic and humanity, a child
should also be eligible for assistance if his father is a needy unemployed worker-
for example, a person who has exhausted unemployment benefits and is not receiv-
ing adequate local assistance." President's Message to Congress on Program for
Economic Growth and Recovery, 1961 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 1032
(emphasis added).
" See H.R. Rep. N. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967), in which the House
Committee on Ways and Means stated: "Third, the bill would make reforms in the
aid to families with dependent children programs:
(1) To give greater emphasis in getting appropriate members of families
drawing aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) payments into
employment and thus no longer dependent on the Welfare roles, the bill would
require the States . .. [to] modify the optional unemployment requirements
throughout the United States."
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ix) (1974).
21 For a thorough discussion of the purposes of the unemployment compensa-
tion program see California Department of Human Resources Development v. Java,
402 U.S. 121 (1971). See also, Note, Charity versus Social Insurance in Unemploy-
ment Compensation Laws, 73 YALE L.J. 357 (1963).
'5 California Department of Human Resources Development v. Java, 402 U.S.
6
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"Unemployment benefits provide cash to a newly unemployed
worker 'at a time when otherwise he would have nothing to spend,'
serving to maintain the recipient at subsistence levels without the
necessity of his turning to welfare or private charity.""6 Of course,
once unemployment compensation has been exhausted, a person
could then turn to AFDC.
If Congress was concerned with reducing the welfare roles dur-
ing the time in which § 607(b)(2)(C)(ii) was enacted, and did
intend that eligibility for, rather than actual receipt of unemploy-
ment compensation be the disqualifying factor, and if Congress
regards AFDC and unemployment compensation as separate and
distinct programs, then why did the enacted 1968 amendment use
the troublesome word "receives" rather than the phrase "qualified
to receive"? One possible reason for this puzzling choice of words
lies in the administrative implications behind the word
"eligibility." A person may be "eligible" for unemployment com-
pensation, but still not receive any benefits for several weeks, due
to state inefficiency and bureaucratic red tape. It is not unreasona-
ble to presume that Congress wanted to make AFDC-U benefits
available during the period between ascertainment of a father's
eligibility for unemployment compensation and the actual pay-
ment of unemployment compensation benefits some time later,
but that it did not intend to permit a father to turn down the
unemployment compensation when payment was finally made.
Reflecting the congressional purpose that AFDC be a program of
last resort, the Supreme Court noted in Shea v. Vialpando, that
"Congress has been careful to ensure that all of the income and
resources properly attributable to a particular applicant be taken
into account .... "2
The Philbrook decision will encourage unemployed fathers to
reject unemployment compensation benefits in favor of AFDC-U
benefits whenever the AFDC-U benefits are greater. A recipient,
even if he wanted to, could not obtain unemployment compensa-
tion benefits supplemented by reduced AFDC-U benefits to bring
him up to the standard of need. As has been suggested, there is no
discernable basis for the conclusion that Congress intended to
employ AFDC benefits as a substitute for an unemployment com-
121 (1971).
11 Id. at 131-32.
27 416 U.S. 251, 261 (1974).
[Vol. 78
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pensation check which an indi-fidual qualified for, but refused to
accept.
On the basis of Philbrook, a state which has been participat-
ing in the AFDC-U program may do one of two things: it may elect
to simply terminate its AFDC-U participation (thus depriving
many families with fathers who are unemployed but ineligible for
unemployment compensation of any assistance whatsoever), or it
may choose to remain in the program by revising its eligibility
requirements in conformance with Philbrook.
There are many reasons why a state would choose not to termi-
nate its AFDC-U program. Termination of the program would re-
sult in the loss of substantial federal funds. 8 While it would also
result in the saving of some state funds, this saving may not be
worth the loss of federal funds. Further, termination of a state's
AFDC-U program29 would deprive many truly needy families who
are not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits of a nec-
essary source of assistance, and could also be an incentive for more
fathers to abandon their families, permitting the family to qualify
under the "absence from home" provision of AFDC.2
Given these consequences, most states are likely to continue
to participate in the AFDC-U program. However, permitting this
circumvention of the obligation to exhaust unemployment com-
pensation will result in shifting the burden of supporting families
of unemployed fathers from the private sector (unemployment
compensation) to the public sector (AFDC). The total burden will
be forced upon the already strained welfare budgets supported by
public tax revenues, while the former employers of those unem-
ployed fathers become the primary beneficiaries of this decision by
virtue of a reduction in the amounts paid out of the state's unem-
ployment fund .3 These employers would benefit through reduced
11 The federal government will reimburse five sixths of the money a state
expends, subject to limitations on maximum dollar amounts. In addition, the fed-
eral government assumes 75 per cent of the administrative cost of the program. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 603(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1970).
22 At present, there are 25 states which have elected to participate in the
AFDC-U program. They are: California, Colorado, Delaware, Dist. of Columbia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
11 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(1) (1970).
3' Unemployment compensation benefits are paid out of state unemployment
8
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rates of contribution, with those employers who exercise irresponsi-
ble hiring and layoff policies reaping the greatest benefit. Compa-
nies who hire excessive numbers of workers in order to fully exploit
periods of strong economic growth, and who discharge a similarly
large number of employees when the economy falters, would be
given even more incentive to continue this practice. Many employ-
ers of seasonal workers would also be benefited. In the past, the
practice of some seasonal employers to pay substandard wages
during work months followed by cyclical periods of unemployment
in which employees were supported by unemployment compensa-
tion has been mitigated by the direct effect of employee claims on
employer contributions. The effect of the Philbrook decision will
be to encourage increasing use of public monies as a wage supple-
ment. It will cost employers less to discharge workers for short
periods since the workers will probably be supported by AFDC-U
rather than unemployment compensation. By virtue of astute
manipulation of hiring and layoff policies these employers may be
able, in effect, to obtain subsidies provided by the taxpayers.
Additionally, although it is widely assumed that most of those
who collect unemployment compensation are poor or near-poor,
studies have shown that, in fact, middle and upper income families
receive most of the unemployment compensation." Among the
possible reasons advanced for this surprising conclusion are that
the poor are often ineligible for unemployment benefits because
they are more likely to have worked in uncovered occupations, to
have worked for too short a period to qualify for benefits, to have
quit their last job, or to have remained unemployed long enough
to exhaust their benefits.33 Therefore, the decision in Philbrook will
provide more benefits to the middle class than to the truly needy
poor and near-poor.
Finally, the total burden on public revenues will be increased
in an even greater amount than by the increase in AFDC-U pay-
ments alone. In many states, by virtue of their becoming AFDC
recipients, families would become automatically eligible for Medi-
compensation trust funds. These funds are collected from private employers. The
amount of money an employer is required to pay into the state fund is determined
by the amount paid out to employees discharged by each particular employer. See
California Department of Human Resources Development v. Java, 402 U.S. at 125.
32 27 Nat'l Tax J. 231 (1974).
Id. at 237.
[Vol. 78
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caid and Food Stamp benefits,34 thus creating a dual burden on
public revenues. First, by increasing the total package of "AFDC-
U option" benefits which an individual must weigh against the
"unemployment compensation option" benefits, it will cause more
people to choose the former. Second, the cost for each AFDC-U
recipient will be increased by the amount of the additional benefits
provided.
The Philbrook decision, while tending to increase the level of
benefits available to families with unemployed fathers, interferes
with the intended functions of state unemployment compensation
programs. By shifting the burden of support from the private to the
public sector, Philbrook creates what is, in effect, a public subsidy
for unconscionable employers. In the absence of a complete revi-
sion of welfare laws, Congress should at least pass legislation
amending 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(2)(C)(ii) to require an individual to
accept unemployment compensation which he is entitled to re-
ceive. If the amount obtainable under unemployment compensa-
tion is less than the amount which he would receive under AFDC-
U, then he should be permitted to obtain this additional amount
from the AFDC-U program. This solution would provide the recipi-
ent with the same level of benefits which he would receive now
under Philbrook, but would increase the public burden only
slightly, while the private burden remained the same.
Vincent A. Collins
1, Brief for appellant Philbrook at 27, Philbrook v. Glodgett, 95 S. Ct. 1893
(1975).
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